Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684
Registo completo
Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Wang, Xue | por |
dc.contributor.author | Bohn, Frank | por |
dc.contributor.author | Veiga, Francisco José | por |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-05-23T13:45:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-05-23T13:45:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Wang, X., Bohn, F., & Veiga, F. J. (2023, March). When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?. European Journal of Political Economy. Elsevier BV. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320 | por |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-2680 | por |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684 | - |
dc.description | Available online 17 October 2022. | por |
dc.description | The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) databases of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, the Polity 5 database, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Freedom House, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database and Dalamagas’s (1992) research. | - |
dc.description.abstract | We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies. | por |
dc.description.sponsorship | (undefined) | por |
dc.language.iso | eng | por |
dc.publisher | Elsevier 1 | por |
dc.rights | openAccess | por |
dc.subject | Debt illusion | por |
dc.subject | Deficit | por |
dc.subject | Ego rent | por |
dc.subject | Fiscal policy | por |
dc.subject | Political budget cycles | por |
dc.subject | Political economy | por |
dc.title | When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more? | por |
dc.type | article | - |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268022001239 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 77 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 77 | por |
dc.date.updated | 2023-05-23T13:01:26Z | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320 | por |
dc.subject.fos | Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão | por |
dc.subject.wos | Social Sciences | por |
sdum.export.identifier | 12603 | - |
sdum.journal | European Journal of Political Economy | por |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | - |
dc.subject.jel | E62 | - |
dc.subject.jel | H62 | - |
dc.identifier.articlenumber | 102320 | por |
Aparece nas coleções: | EEG - Artigos em revistas de circulação internacional com arbitragem científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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Wang_Bohn_Veiga_2023_EJPE.pdf | 803,79 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |