Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77375
Registo completo
Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ghandour, Ziad | por |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | por |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-02T14:43:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-01-01T07:00:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Ghandour, Z., Straume, O.R. Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation. J Econ (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00778-8 | por |
dc.identifier.issn | 0931-8658 | por |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77375 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the optimal design of a public funding scheme in a mixed oligopoly setting (with applications to health care and education) with one welfare-maximising public provider and two profit-maximising private providers, where all providers compete on quality and where providers included in the public funding scheme are subject to price regulation. We find that the first-best solution cannot be implemented without including (at least) one of the private providers in the public funding scheme. However, inclusion of only one of the private providers is sufficient to induce the first-best outcome. Such inclusion allows for the elimination of a negative competition externality between the private providers that, all else equal, yields underprovision of quality. | por |
dc.description.sponsorship | We thank three anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. This paper is financed by National Funds of the FCT-Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology within the project UID/ECO/03182/2019. Ziad Ghandour also acknowledges support from FCT through the PhD Studentship SFRH/BD/144210/2019 | por |
dc.language.iso | eng | por |
dc.publisher | Springer | por |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/POR_NORTE/SFRH%2FBD%2F144210%2F2019/PT | por |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UID%2FECO%2F03182%2F2019/PT | por |
dc.rights | openAccess | por |
dc.subject | Competition | por |
dc.subject | Mixed oligopoly | por |
dc.subject | Public funding | por |
dc.subject | Quality | por |
dc.title | Optimal funding coverage in a mixed oligopoly with quality competition and price regulation | por |
dc.type | article | - |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00712-022-00778-8 | por |
oaire.citationStartPage | 201 | por |
oaire.citationEndPage | 225 | por |
oaire.citationIssue | 3 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 136 | por |
dc.date.updated | 2022-04-29T08:26:23Z | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1617-7134 | por |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00712-022-00778-8 | por |
dc.subject.wos | Social Sciences | - |
sdum.export.identifier | 11111 | - |
sdum.journal | Journal of Economics | por |
oaire.version | AM | por |
Aparece nas coleções: | EEG - Artigos em revistas de circulação internacional com arbitragem científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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Triopoly_27Jan2022_merged.pdf | Author's Accepted Manuscript | 480,08 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |