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https://hdl.handle.net/1822/7192
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Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Torres, Francisco | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-12-05T21:41:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-12-05T21:41:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | NIPE Working Paper series; 22 | eng |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/7192 | - |
dc.description | Forthcoming in F. Torres, A. Verdun, and H. Zimmermann, EMU Rules: The Political and Economic Consequences of European Monetary Integration, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft I wish to thank Svetlozar Andreev, Stefano Bartolini, Annette Bongardt, Alessandra Chirico, Paul De Grauwe, Erik Jones, Philippe Schmitter, Suzanne Schüttemeyer, Amy Verdun, Neil Walker, Helen Wallace, Chiara Zilioli, Hubert Zimmermann and participants at the EUI conference and ECB seminar for very useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Of course, all remaining errors and shortcomings are my sole responsibility. | eng |
dc.description.abstract | This paper addresses the question whether the process of European monetary integration implies efficiency-legitimacy trade-off. The paper considers that the process of monetary policy delegation to the European Central Bank (ECB), ratified by all European Union (EU) parliaments, was a non-zero-sum game, increasing both the efficiency and the legitimacy of monetary policy in the eurozone. There was however a change in the nature of delegation: the initial principal (EU national governments and/or parliaments) delegated to the agent (the ECB) control over its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. The paper distinguishes two types of constraints for monetary policy: credibility constraints and political constraints. The change in the nature of delegation of monetary policy (tying the hands of the principal) was a means of dealing with credibility constraints. The paper goes on investigating whether, and if so to what extent, the European Parliament (EP) is fit to function as a principal of the ECB as a means of dealing with political constraints. Thus, the paper analyses the European Parliament’s increased involvement in overseeing the Central Bank’s activities, aiming at understanding whether and how that new and special role (an informal institution of dialogue) could affect the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in the conduct of monetary policy in the eurozone. | eng |
dc.description.sponsorship | This paper is part of an FCT research project on Economic Growth, Convergence and Institutions (research grant POCI/EGE/55423/2004, partially funded by FEDER). | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.publisher | Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) | eng |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/POCI/55423/PT | - |
dc.rights | openAccess | eng |
dc.subject | Economic and Monetary Union | eng |
dc.subject | Monetary policy delegation | eng |
dc.subject | Efficiency and legitimacy | eng |
dc.subject | Accountability | eng |
dc.subject | Responsiveness | eng |
dc.subject | Principal-agent relations | eng |
dc.subject | Governance | eng |
dc.title | On the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EMU | eng |
dc.type | workingPaper | eng |
dc.comments | NIPE – Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas – is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology through the Programa Operacional Ciência e Inovação 2010 (POCI 2010) of the III Quadro Comunitário de Apoio (QCA III), which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. | eng |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIPE - Documentos de Trabalho |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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NIPE_WP_22_2007.pdf | Documento principal | 490,36 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |