Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/45546
Título: | The effect of competition on executive compensation and incentives: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment |
Autor(es): | Fernandes, Ana P. Ferreira, Priscila Winters, L. Alan |
Palavras-chave: | Entry Deregulation Product Market Competition Executive Compensation Managerial Incentives Performance-related Pay |
Data: | 2018 |
Editora: | University of Wisconsin Press |
Revista: | Journal of Human Resources |
Resumo(s): | This paper studies the effect of increased product market competition on executive compensation and incentives. We use a reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment, and exploit its staggered implementation across municipalities for identification. Using employer-employee data, we find that increased competition following the reform raised total pay but reduced the sensitivity of pay to firm performance. This is consistent with theoretical results showing that a fall in entry costs weakens managerial incentive provision. Entry deregulation also increased performance-induced CEO turnover and firms’ probability of exit, suggesting that competition provides direct incentives for managerial effort. |
Tipo: | Artigo |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/45546 |
DOI: | 10.3368/jhr.53.3.0215-6963R1 |
ISSN: | 0022-166X |
e-ISSN: | 1548-8004 |
Arbitragem científica: | yes |
Acesso: | Acesso restrito UMinho |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIMA - Artigos/Papers |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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Fernandes_JHR_manuscript_5811.pdf Acesso restrito! | 303,6 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |