Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/36624
Título: | Hospital competition with soft budgets |
Autor(es): | Brekke, Kurt R. Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
Palavras-chave: | Cost efficiency hospital competition quality soft budgets |
Data: | 22-Abr-2015 |
Editora: | Wiley |
Revista: | The Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
Resumo(s): | We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First-best is achieved by a strict no-bailout and no-profit-confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare-improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high-cost patients. |
Tipo: | Artigo |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/36624 |
DOI: | 10.1111/sjoe.12111 |
ISSN: | 0347-0520 |
Versão da editora: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12111/abstract |
Arbitragem científica: | yes |
Acesso: | Acesso restrito UMinho |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets_2015.pdf Acesso restrito! | Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets | 626,52 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |