Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/30225
Título: | The effect of competition on managers’ compensation : evidence from a quasi-natural experiment |
Autor(es): | Ferreira, Priscila Fernandes, Ana Winters, L. Alan |
Palavras-chave: | Entry deregulation Executive compensation Performance-related pay Product market competition |
Data: | Jul-2014 |
Editora: | Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) |
Resumo(s): | This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives. |
Tipo: | Documento de trabalho |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/30225 |
ISSN: | 0265-8003 |
Versão da editora: | www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP10054.php |
Arbitragem científica: | yes |
Acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIMA - Documentos de Trabalho/Working Papers |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
CEPR-DP10054.pdf | CEPR Discussion Paper No. 10054 | 289,84 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |