Metaphor and truth : a review of representation reconsidered by W. M. Ramsey

Abstract

William M. Ramsey’s Representation Reconsidered (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) is a critical evaluation of the use of representational notions in cognitive science. Ramsey distinguishes different types of representational posits and argues that only one of them, the sort of structured representation that is assumed in the computational theory of mind, remains true to representationalism. Other uses of “representation” are more akin to the concepts of receptor, transduction, or causal mediation, and do not entail any actual representational role. In recent times, the increasing use of representational notions of the latter kind leads Ramsey to suspect that under the cover of its representational umbrella, cognitive science is actually moving back to behaviorism. Regardless of its conclusions, Ramsey’s book is highly readable, philosophically careful, and provocative. It uncovers widespread ambiguity and confusion in cognitive science. By Ramsey’s own analysis, however, it is the validity of all concepts of internal representation, not just some of them, that can be questioned. Whatever scientific truths lurk behind the representational narrative, they are best uncovered and characterized without appealing to any concept of representation.