Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/15591

TítuloDelegatable homomorphic encryption with applications to secure outsourcing of computation
Autor(es)Barbosa, Manuel
Farshim, Pooya
Palavras-chaveCryptography
Delegatable homomorphic encryption
Homomorphism delegation
Homomorphic encryption
Functional encryption
Verifiable computation
Provable security
Public-key cryptography
Data2012
EditoraSpringer Verlag
RevistaLecture Notes in Computer Science
Resumo(s)In this work we propose a new cryptographic primitive called Delegatable Homomorphic Encryption (DHE). This allows a Trusted Authority to control/delegate the capability to evaluate circuits over encrypted data to untrusted workers/evaluators by issuing tokens. This primitive can be both seen as a public-key counterpart to Verifiable Computation, where input generation and output verification are performed by different entities, or as a generalisation of Fully Homomorphic Encryption enabling control over computations on encrypted data. Our primitive comes with a series of extra features as follows: 1) there is a one-time setup procedure for all circuits; 2) senders do not need to be aware of the functions which will be evaluated on the encrypted data, nor do they need to register keys; 3) tokens are independent of senders and receiver; and 4) receivers are able to verify the correctness of computation given short auxiliary information on the input data and the function, independently of the complexity of the computed circuit. We give a modular construction of such a DHE scheme from three components: Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), Functional Encryption (FE), and a (customised) MAC. As a stepping stone, we first define Verifiable Functional Encryption (VFE), and then show how one can build a secure DHE scheme from a VFE and an FHE scheme. We also show how to build the required VFE from a standard FE together with a MAC scheme. All our results hold in the standard model.Finally, we show how one can build a verifiable computation (VC) scheme generically from a DHE. As a corollary, we get the first VC scheme which remains verifiable even if the attacker can observe verification results
TipoArtigo em ata de conferência
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/15591
ISBN9783642279539
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-27954-6_19
ISSN0302-9743
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoAcesso aberto
Aparece nas coleções:HASLab - Artigos em atas de conferências internacionais (texto completo)
DI/CCTC - Relatórios Técnicos

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