CHAPTER 13

BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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13.1 Introduction

The roots of the administrative sciences can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson's classical article entitled 'The Study of Administration', published in the *Political Science Quarterly* in 1887. In this short piece, the author argues for the separation between politics and administration, with elected officials deciding on and approving laws, and administrators being responsible for their politically neutral implementation. Based on the principles of scientific management (Taylor, 1911) and modern bureaucracy (Weber, 1921), the science of administration should be primarily concerned with devising good management practices to improve administration and serve the public interest, independently of political opportunity or short-term electoral concerns.

These ideas represent the theoretical synthesis of a progressive movement of reform advocating for the introduction of merit-based systems in public administration to replace the 'spoils system' as the dominant form of recruitment for national civil services during a significant part of the nineteenth century. The publication of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) in Great Britain and the approval of the Pendleton Act (1883) in the United States, together with the bureaucratic tradition of the European continent, created an environment conducive to the emergence of administrative theory and the science of (public) administration. The assumption was that, with the exception of the very top level of public administration, all the other positions should be filled by career civil servants hired on the basis of their merit rather than their political partisan loyalties.

These early development theories and programmatic ideals never found their way into Portuguese public administration. In Portugal, public administration under the New State regime (*Estado Novo*, 1926–1974) was primarily dominated by the bureaucracy, and the concept of a separation between politics and administration in the Wilsonian sense was completely absent. The directors general played a fundamental policy-making role in government with strategic control over the entire Portuguese public administration, not only due to their position in the hierarchical structure but also due to the intricate system of rules,

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authorizations and formal procedures under their control (Madureira, 2007). Their loyalty was secured through a combination of highly centralized rules, an expectation of receiving rewards in exchange for their firm allegiance to the single party (the *União Nacional*), and the remarkable power and prestige they derived from their influence in the political process, often surpassing those of the ministers themselves. Similarly, career civil servants were rewarded primarily for their loyalty to the regime rather than competence and merit-based criteria. During the New State regime, the bureaucracy took on a central policy-making role in government but failed in the most crucial element: a connection to democratic theory.

By the mid-twentieth century, the Weber-Wilson paradigm, which had been the dominant force in the study and practice of public administration during the first half of the century in the United States, came under heavy scrutiny (Ostrom, 1973). One of its critics, Dwight Waldo (1948), was concerned with the focus of public administration on efficiency and the neglect of the moral responsibility of the administrators serving as guarantors of democratic institutions. He noted that the attempt to limit the study of public administration to technical matters and having efficiency as the dominant value were incompatible with the theory of democracy and would become a problem not only for the managerial level, but for society as a whole. Waldo also criticized the idea of 'scientific principles' of management that could be ethically valid and discovered by science, stating that politics and administration are inseparable, and that complete efficiency is not always compatible with democracy.

By the time the New State regime had been overthrown (1974), it was clear that Portuguese public administration had failed on both accounts. On the one hand, the regime had failed to implement a merit-based system and to pursue the efficiency and responsiveness goals supported by the Weber-Wilson paradigm and typical of modern bureaucracies in Western Europe. Bureaucratic organizations conveyed a sense of feebleness and impersonality, and civil servants remained unaccountable to citizens. On the other hand, Waldo's ideals of democratic governance were never implemented and, while the bureaucracy was a centrepiece of the regime, its mission was completely misguided, as we shall see.

After the process of democratization, the introduction of New Public Management principles and practices in the 1990–2010 period represented a sort of late adoption of the Weber-Wilson paradigm, given its goal to improve the system's efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness. However, despite this positive evolution, the democratic principles underscored in Waldo's account of the administrative state remained largely absent from the Portuguese context. Due to the nature of the New State regime, the deficient professionalization of Portuguese civil service after democratization, and the conflict between legal and managerial principles and practices over the last two decades, the administrative state as idealized by Waldo remains an unfulfilled promise in Portugal to this day.

Following this introduction, the second and third sections in this chapter focus on a discussion around the administrative state model such as it was introduced by Waldo, and present historical evidence to support the claim that Portuguese public administration can be described as a warped version of this model. The fourth section shows how the influence of ideas and practices from the New Public Management reform began to subvert the bureaucratic state by relaxing the hold on administrative law within the context of day-to-day administration. Sections 13.5 and 13.6 reflect on the absence of democratic values in public service delivery and how this relates to the amalgam of two logics—one legal and the other managerial—often at odds with each other. Section 13.7 argues that the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can become a key enabler to overcome the current

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conflict between the two logics, as long as there is a constant awareness of their limitations. The last section concludes and suggests future avenues of research on Portuguese public administration.

13.2 THE DARK SIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE NEW STATE (1926–1974)

This section discusses the characteristics of Portuguese public administration and argues that the relationships between elected officials and top-level managers in Portugal can be best understood in light of Waldo's concept. There are at least three features of Portuguese public administration that fit within the administrative state model: a) an absence of separation between politics and administration; b) administrators in the public arena play a fundamental policy-making role in government; and c) the bureaucracy is professionalized. However, the combination of the development of the bureaucracy during the New State regime and the managerial reforms that took place during the democratic period resulted in a subversion of the ideals underlying the administrative state model.

Rocha (1991) argues that Salazar failed to institutionalize the corporate structures of the New State due to the existence of a powerful and highly centralized administrative system. This author proposes the model of the administrative state as an alternative to the state corporatist model to explain the evolution of Portuguese public administration.

By contrast, Madureira (2007) notes that it is not that corporatism was absent, but rather that it was subject to direct state control and indirect supervision through

the direct appointment of administrative commissions to rule over guilds and national unions, the granting of the rights of political representation to the bureaucrats of the co-ordination boards, the creation of administrative bodies to inspect and approve the daily activities of collective organisations, and the orchestration of public events on the initiative of ministers (Madureira 2007: 95; Lucena 1976).

Nowhere was this more evident than in the Directorate-General of Industry, where even after the Democratic Revolution of 1974, left-wing governments used nationalizations to promote an interventionist economic policy that reinforced the bureaucratic administrative control of industrial activity (Araújo, 2001).

The power of the bureaucracy during the New State regime was grounded on a traditional model characterized by authority, hierarchy, and corporatism. The values and attitudes of the bureaucratic elite, together with centralized administrative procedures, contributed to the persistence of the regime and to the permanence of its actors. The power of the administrative state was pervasive and designed to respect societal traditions and prevent modernization. The institutionalization of the bureaucracy in Portugal facilitated the long period of stability that was pervasive during the New State, as well as the smooth transition of the administration to democracy amidst the political turmoil of the first decade after the 1974 Revolution.

The meetings of the Council of Ministers were merely symbolic, not least because Salazar's decisions were made with his ministers in one-to-one meetings (Costa Pinto, 2000). Even

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more frequently, Salazar would meet directly with the directors-general, thus bypassing the political process altogether in favour of the bureaucratic arena (Rocha, 1991). In this scenario, corporations played a small role in the political process, and the main political and economic decisions were concentrated in the hands of the bureaucratic elite.

Furthermore, the administrative structure operated under Salazar's firm control, reflecting the concentration of power on the prime minister, a fundamental condition to upholding the regime. One way to retain this power was to ensure that leaders were selected based on trust—often personal trust. For example, Salazar's cabinet was made up of people he trusted, such as his brother-in-law, former students, old friends from his time at the seminar and university, and former members of his personal staff (Lewis, 1978). According to Silva (2020), this historical tradition partly explains the continuing politicization of Portuguese public administration, namely the tendency to reward the loyalty of political supporters by appointing them to government roles. This habit remained unchanged in the period of 1974–1975, after the democratic transition, and was boosted by the fact that political parties wished to ensure the mobilization of the electorate and signal the expansion of popular support.

The final aspect that the Portuguese pre-1974 bureaucracy had in common with the administrative state model was its comparatively high level of professionalization. Madureira (2007: 95) emphasizes the fact that Portugal became a 'bureaucratically managed economy': 'the strategy of constantly adding new organisations and imposing higher levels of centralisation returned control to the central administration through the medium of intermediary structures'. Ironically, however, the institutionalization of the bureaucracy during the New State served to promote the consultation of corporative interests and constituted a way to participate in the policymaking process under tight state control (Madureira, 2007). While the system was by no means democratic, as advocated in Waldo's administrative state model, it did contain escape valves to coopt private interests and accommodate some of the aspirations of corporative organizations such as unions, guilds, and coordination boards.

13.3 PORTUGUESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE WAKE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the replacement of senior managers at the top echelons of public administration was clearly insufficient to change the organizational culture that had been prevalent in the Portuguese public administration during the New State, and this contributed to the continuity of a large section of the bureaucratic elite. Despite the political upheavals that characterized the transition to democracy—and the way in which the administrative machinery was dismantled as a result of reorganizations—the tendency to select leaders based on personal trust criteria persisted. The appointment to the top-tier positions in Portuguese public administration remained limited to top-level career civil servants, even when recruitment among managers of the private sector was allowed. Moreover, seniority was considered a key criterion for appointment, not only because it was regarded as a source of knowledge and continuity, but also as a means of self-protection and resistance to change (Rocha, 1991).

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Paradoxically, the level of professionalization declined in the period immediately after the Democratic Revolution of 1974. The replacement of the old administrative elite was limited, and this partial renewal was not accompanied by the professionalization of civil service ranks. Instead, political appointments were employed to enhance the network of political support and mobilize the electorate, resulting in the largest political parties (the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party) controlling the State apparatus (Silva, 2020). The accelerated growth of public sector employment due to the expansion of the welfare state and the nationalizations enacted after 1974 also facilitated this process. In stark contrast with the adversarial nature of the Westminster model, in Portugal, elected officials and top and mid-level managers shared similar interests, with politicians wanting to keep a tight grip on the administration and managers wishing to retain their power and privileges (Rocha, 1991).

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The highly institutionalized nature of Portuguese public administration partially explains the conservative nature of changes in the administrative structure, organization, actors, and practices. Most attempts at conducting significant administrative reforms have been promoted in a top-down fashion, largely ignoring both street-level bureaucrats and citizens. A firm belief in the 'magical properties of the law' is mainly to blame for this attitude by political reformers, many of them with a background in the legal professions, as if the mere approval of legislation is sufficient to change behaviours and mindsets.

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The next section shows how the influence of the ideas and practices of the New Public Management movement began to breach the walls of the bureaucratic state by loosening the tight grip of administrative law on the daily functioning of the administration.

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13.4 THE INFLUENCE OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN PORTUGUESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Inspired by the assumptions of Public Choice Theory and influenced by business management practices, the New Public Management (NPM) movement became the dominant paradigm among practitioners of Public Administration (Gow and Dufour, 2000). The now classic piece by Christopher Hood, *A Public Management for All Seasons?* (1991) listed the main tendencies, including: 1) professionalization of public management; 2) emphasis on performance measurement and evaluation of results, not procedures; 3) fragmentation of the public sector into separate organizations 'at arm's length' (*agencies*); 4) introduction of competition in the public sector whenever possible; and e) adoption of private management tools (flexible personnel, financial, and procurement rules).

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The NPM reforms enacted in Portugal during the 1990–2010 period sought to improve the relationship between public administration and its citizens. International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and especially the Public Management (PUMA) Committee, created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1989, played a major role in disseminating the set of ideas that would become NPM (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). The book *Reinventing Government*, by Osborne and Gaebler (1992), and the Gore Report (1993) synthesized NPM theory and



practice, and had a long-lasting influence on public administration reforms around the world. Portugal was no exception in this respect, and the NPM ideas fuelled by international organizations were disseminated by the National Institute of Administration (INA), by academics in the field of Public Administration (Rocha, 1991, 2011; Araújo, 2002), and by policy entrepreneurs with both political and managerial experience (Corte-Real, 1995).

At first, reforms targeted the excessive focus on rules and procedures by concentrating on administrative simplification and improvements in service delivery. Public administration became more accessible, responsive, and effective, reducing the perceived distance between the rulers and the ruled. Part of this effort was symbolic and/or rhetorical, replacing legalistic concepts such as 'subjects' or 'administered' with 'clients' or 'service users', but it is undeniable that many of the changes were substantial and generated significant improvements in the way public administration carries out service delivery (for examples of these success stories see Tavares, 2019). Later, administrative reforms targeted the way that the system related to citizens, moving beyond the typical standardization of the Weberian bureaucracy to embrace customer primacy and multiple aspects related to quality in the provision of public services.

During the 1990s, public administration reforms in OECD countries largely followed the NPM principles described previously. In Portugal, the emphasis was on quality management initiatives using concepts and tools imported from the private sector, such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) norms, quality control circles, continuous improvement, the multiple-item scale for measuring consumer perceptions of service quality (SERVQUAL) model (Parasuraman et al., 1988), among others. The introduction of one-stop shops at the end of the decade is representative of a significant shift in focus and a genuine attempt at altering the prevailing administrative culture (Rocha, 2011). The repetition of the quality mantra placed citizen-customers at the centre of the administration's activity and shifted the focus away from rules and procedures to missions and results (Tavares, 2019).

The decade was also characterized by a multiplication of public organizations and quasigovernmental organizations kept 'at arm's length' from the State. The motivation was to reduce the tight grip of administrative law, increase managerial autonomy, and, whenever possible, introduce competition between public agencies. However, this proliferation of public agencies (*Institutos Públicos*) may have a less benign explanation, as empirical work by Silva (2018) suggests that the creation of public agencies did not encumber parties in government control, as ministers retained power over the appointment of management boards. The institutional fragmentation which resulted from these reforms was not accompanied by the necessary coordination within the public sector, thus leading to frequent failures in service delivery due to the creation of functional silos. This tendency towards institutional fragmentation is not exactly new. Lawrence Graham, a keen observer of Portuguese politics in the first decade after the revolution, noted that during the New State 'each ministry became a kind of holding-company operating within its own policy ... Within each ministry, there was a similar fragmentation existing among organisational subunits' (Graham, 1975: 56). So, while the sources and nature of the fragmentation are different, the creation of silos and the lack of coordination remains, leading to deficiencies in policymaking and implementation.

Moreover, these NPM trends were developed under the dominant logic of legalregulatory compliance, thus producing an amalgam of legal and managerial principles and practices which were incompatible and frequently at odds with each other (Chevallier and

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Loschak, 1982). In other words, the juxtaposition of managerial reforms on a pre-existing culture grounded on administrative law and procedures resulted in profound dysfunctions in the delivery of public services which are still visible today, as evidenced by the disagreement between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development, and the Institute of Conservation of Nature and Forests surrounding the felling of cork oaks (*Público*, 18 May 2018), or the recent conflict between the two police forces (*Polícia de Segurança Pública* and *Guarda Nacional Republicana*) over escorting the convoy for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines (*Expresso*, 28 December 2020). In these and other examples, formalism, legal procedures, and jurisdiction squabbles may (or may not) take precedence over the public interest; whether they do or not is uncertain, which points to a certain unpredictability and to a case-by-case approach when it comes to defending the public interest.

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The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a continuation of this trend, with the comprehensive reform of Portuguese public administration following the tenets of New Public Management. Several initiatives enacted by law demonstrate this tendency: the public sector performance evaluation system (2004), the liberalization of the notary profession (2005), the Central State Administration Restructuring Program (PRACE, 2005), the Administrative and Legislative Simplification Program (Simplex, 2006), and the law that introduced flexibility in administrative careers, both in terms of employment and wages (2008).

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The crisis of sovereign debt forced the Portuguese government to reach out for joint financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2011 led to a series of administrative reforms and reorganizations at all levels of government. In 2012, the government led by Passos Coelho, then-prime minister, established the Recruitment and Selection Commission for Public Administration (CReSAP), in an attempt to ensure that professional competence was of paramount importance when recruiting for senior management positions in the central administration of the State. This type of independent commission already existed in other European countries and aimed to reduce the influence of politicization in the appointment of top-level bureaucrats (Silva, 2020).

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Following the earlier PRACE, the Plan for the Reduction and Improvement of the Central Administration of the State (PREMAC, 2013) emphasized processes of extinction and merging services, with a view to greater efficiency through economies of scale and eliminating service duplication. Despite the commitment to ensuring well-grounded technical decisions, political choices and electoral calculus plagued these reforms, requiring constant compromises and negotiations (Carvalho, 2013). Although these compromises between technical rationality and political logic provided greater legitimacy to the proposed solutions, they often reduced the effectiveness of choices made (Tavares, 2019).

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The administrative reforms conducted over the past 40 years recognized the importance of shifting the focus from a depersonalized, formalized, and procedural, input-oriented administration to an open, modernized, citizen-focused, and output-oriented administration. As the bureaucracy began serving citizens instead of the regime, Portuguese public administration largely overcame the dark side of the administrative state deployed during the New State. However, despite some important successes achieved at service delivery level, limitations remain at the level of policy-making, as well as deficiencies in the representativeness of the bureaucracy in pursuing public interest. The following section highlights some of these lingering problems.





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13.4 THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN PORTUGAL AS AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE

Scholars investigating the evolution of Portuguese public administration at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century noted that the reforms were clearly driven by the principles of NPM (Rocha, 2011). However, while it is impossible to deny the important role that NPM reforms played in modernizing Portuguese public administration, the administrative state remains an unfulfilled promise. On the one hand, the reforms were not profound enough to achieve a shift in the culture of immutability prevailing in many services, as organizations tend to reproduce their genetic code to evade change (Araújo, 2002). On the other hand, strong public sector unions with close ties to the Communist Party have prevented large-scale reforms of civil service laws, even though their power has been weakened by the sharp increase in the use of individual employment contracts to replace collective bargaining (Rocha, 2011). Resistance to change by civil servants combined with low levels of civic engagement, even in highly urbanized areas, partially explains why public administration reforms tend to be incremental. More importantly, a culture of policy evalu-

and the aspects where the administration is still lagging.

NPM reforms injected a focus on citizens as customers of public services, increasing the levels of efficiency and responsiveness in service delivery. This was an undeniably important step to change the red-tape focused administration of the New State. However, as a result of the NPM-based administrative reforms juxtaposed on pre-existing structures, poorly organized services, and the predominance of administrative law, the performance and quality of service delivery in Portuguese public administration remains uneven. There are 'islands of excellence', such as the tax administration office or the Agency for Administrative Modernisation, where technological advancements, innovative practices, and performance goals prevail. Other services, like the Social Security Institute or the Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service, struggle with significant pressures from client demands, leading to a negative public image associated with poor communication, long queues, slow responsiveness, and diminished accountability. On balance, Portuguese public administration has become more efficient, effective, and responsive. But is it more democratic?

ation is completely absent from the Portuguese government and administration, making the assessment of administrative reforms even more problematic and prolonging the deficit of public sector accountability. As a result, very few performance indicators capable of providing a longitudinal account of the evolution of public service performance are made public. With these limitations in mind, we attempt to discuss some of the areas of progress

For the most part, reformers have failed to understand the motivations, dynamics, and social values undergirding public organizations. Top-down reforms tend to neglect the aspirations of both street level bureaucrats and citizens, hoping that the mere approval of legislation would operate changes in the attitudes and mentalities of all those affected by the reforms. More tellingly, scholars investigating administrative reforms in Portugal have

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¹ A study by Silva et al. (2008) shows that only about 11 per cent of those living in municipalities above 50,000 residents are likely to contact a politician or an upper-level civil servant. The number is even lower for those living in smaller municipalities.

failed to address issues of public participation, digital inclusion, and coproduction in service delivery. The levels of public participation in the administration are low compared to other European countries (Silva, 2020), not only because citizens remain detached from the administration, but also because the system does not provide the appropriate channels of communication and interaction with stakeholders.

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Furthermore, while it is true that the performance of the administration has improved significantly, it is no less true that the level of demands from citizens have also evolved. As evidence of improved performance, data provided by the Database of Contemporary Portugal (PORDATA) shows that the number of pending cases in the Office of the Ombudsman (Provedor de Justiça) has decreased sharply from the highest value of 8,053 cases in 1994 to the lowest value of 1,996 cases in 2011, at the onset of the austerity policy measures triggered by the financial bailout. In sharp contrast, citizen complaints have increased, as the number of cases filed increased during the same period from 3,811 to 5,812. However, few decisions are adopted or undertaken using participatory or deliberative instruments with citizen input. The explanation for the limited use of bottom-up approaches to public administration in Portugal is largely explained by the country's excessive centralization (Teles, 2021). The best examples of the use of bottom-up approaches occur at the local level, with multiple successful experiences of participatory budgeting and social networks to fight poverty and exclusion at the municipal level. Community policing to solve local problems and strengthen relationships between the police and the public is also common in more remote areas of the country through the action of the Guarda Nacional Republicana. However, these examples are still fragmentary and plagued by the lack of autonomy of deconcentrated field offices and street level bureaucrats.

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13.5 Towards the Democratization of Portuguese Public Administration


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One way to increase bottom-up initiatives in Portuguese public administration would be to focus on enhancing citizen mobilization and participation in democratic decision-making. The best indicator of the democratic deficit in Portuguese society is the democratic deficit of many of its institutions. Non-profit organizations, recreational associations, football clubs, charitable organizations, and other self-governing bodies suffer from a systematic lack of democratic competition. The presence of opposition and electoral challengers is often seen as a burden or a nuisance rather than a sign of the vitality of the system. As a result, some have argued that a democratic administration requires not only the democratization of all levels of government but the widespread democratization of civil society itself (Avritzer, 2002). This argument suggests that the democratization of civil society organizations would help to build a democratic culture from the bottom up, capable of influencing the administration of the state once local actors and agents of change move up into higher levels of government.

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Successful experiences with deliberative mini-publics in Canada, Denmark, United Kingdom, and Brazil also suggest that there are other, more ambitious ways to improve the relationship between the administration and the public. Mini-publics are forums 'small enough to be genuinely deliberative and representative enough to be genuinely democratic'





(Goodin and Dryzek, 2006: 220). Such forums are usually organized by state actors and consist of the locus where citizens represent different points of view and are led to deliberate jointly on a particular issue of public interest (Grönlund et al., 2014a).

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Similarly, deliberative polls are formed by a random sample of citizens, who are encouraged to engage in face-to-face deliberation regarding certain matters of public interest. Participating citizens should have access to information on the topic under discussion, and, using discussion and dialogue, arrive at final solutions that are considered satisfactory for the members of the forum through arguments and votes (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). By guaranteeing a representative sample of the population—and avoiding the predominance of one group over another—mini-publics and deliberative polls are regarded as means to reduce the distance between the administration and the citizens, overcome electoral apathy, and improve political efficacy (Grönlund et al., 2014a).

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The problems in scaling up participatory and deliberative initiatives is well-known and recognized in the literature and we will not examine them here. Instead, we opt to concentrate on ways to reduce the democratic deficit in Portuguese public administration and improve the connection between citizens and the administration. Despite evident setbacks associated with the misuse and unintended impact of technology, ICT tools continue to offer some promise towards facilitating a strong democracy where face-to-face interactions are rendered impossible due to scale issues (Barber, 2003). However, Portuguese governments have yet to capture the full potential of these technologies to improve democratic practice, citizen engagement, and the connection between public administration and the public. The following section discusses the potential role that technological innovations may play in accomplishing these goals.

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13.6 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ICTs as Key Enablers

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In November 2009, the then-Prime Minister José Sócrates stated that 'in 2004, we ranked about halfway down the European ranking of electronic Government [...] today we are the top country among the 27 in all of Europe' (Público, 29 November 2009). More recently, Portugal joined the D9, a group of countries sharing good practices in e-government and lauded by the Minister of the Presidency and Administrative Modernisation, Maria Manuel Leitão Marques, as the G7 of Digital Government (Dinheiro Vivo, 22 November 2018). The rhetoric and symbolic deals-that glorify Portugal's successes within the scope of the digital government are largely exaggerated. Public opinion is often misled by politicians' statements in the media that Portugal is one of the leading countries in digital government, when in fact the situation is far less conducive to this unbridled optimism. In the 2020 edition of the E-Government Survey, published by the United Nations, Portugal ranked 35th in the Electronic Governance Development Index and 41st in the Electronic Participation Index. Lisbon was one of the municipalities assessed in the Local Online Services Index and ranked 26th among the 100 municipalities surveyed (United Nations, 2020). Furthermore, according to Europe's Digital Progress Report (2017), only about 41 per cent of the population relied on e-government services and the Digital Agenda Data (2019) website indicates

that 22 per cent of all Portuguese citizens display low levels of digital skills. Considered together, these indicators point to a mismatch between the progress in the availability of online services and the limitations of digital skills by a large portion of the Portuguese population.

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The availability of digital services has been extended to more and more spheres of public administration, causing greater concerns surrounding digital exclusion, particularly in the case of online only (e.g. mandatory online submission of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) statements). The network of 'Citizen Spaces' (*Espaços Cidadão*) provides services from different entities from a single counter, aiming to address problems related to the digital divide and to ensure that the administration promotes equity in the context of digital governance. Citizen Spaces are more agile and flexible facilities than one-stop shops and offer better conditions for bringing the administration closer to citizens. These services are crucial to help senior citizens, as well as others affected by digital exclusion, respond effectively to online only service delivery.

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Despite the accomplishments at the service delivery level, the disruptive capacity of technological innovation and ICTs is yet to be fully explored in the context of Portuguese public administration. One area where the potential of technological improvements is still underexplored is the reduction in administrative burden. The costs to citizens, firms, and the administration itself have increased as a result of the institutional fragmentation mentioned previously and the need to coordinate decisions and actions undertaken by organizations of the public, private and non-profit sectors. Technological innovation can contribute to reducing the regulatory and procedural burdens associated with these relationships (Nielsen et al., 2017).

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International best practices in service integration and interoperability have often been ignored, with those responsible showing a lack of vision for the future of electronic administration. One of the best examples comes from the Baltic. In Estonia, the administration works according to X-Road protocols, which make it possible to connect electronic services in the public and private sectors, according to the principle that different organizations and information systems must be interoperable. This initiative is aligned with the EU's plans to further develop the Digital Single Market and follows the once-only principle, which states that citizens, institutions, and companies only have to provide certain standard information to the authorities and administrations once. The X-Road protocols guarantee a high degree of security that allows public institutions, companies and individuals to exchange data with complete confidence, and also ensure people's access to the data held. In Portugal, the implementation of the once-only principle is still lagging. The adoption of new Data Protection Laws will likely be used as an excuse to further delay the implementation of these measures (Tavares, 2019).

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Besides the promotion of the once-only principle, part of the administrative burden reduction efforts should target service customization, i.e. ways for customers to express their preferences when it comes to interacting with the administration, which then applies such preferences to making the interactions as simple as possible. Recently implemented by the American Marketing Association (AMA), citizens' ability to get state notifications in a single digital address is a step in the right direction. In addition, the adoption of 'digital by default' policies will ensure that each citizen only interacts with the administration using digital channels, unless there are pressing reasons to do otherwise (Nielsen et al., 2017).

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More importantly for democracy, public services are lagging in promoting and advertising opportunities for civic engagement, including e-voting, e-consultation, crowdsourcing,



crowdfunding, cocreation, and coproduction of public services. There are multiple examples of these practices in public administrations around the world. Administrative rulemaking could benefit significantly from the use of deliberative e-based tools to include individuals and organizations traditionally excluded from regulatory processes (Nam, 2020). Digital platform moderators play a pivotal role in facilitating active discussions, encouraging both within-group and between-group interactions to avoid increasing levels of homophily and polarization witnessed in social media platforms (Medaglia and Zhu, 2017). The Canadian federal government agency for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) uses social media as a customer service tool as users reach out to government agencies at a time and location convenient to them to look for responses that are customized to their needs (Gintova, 2019). The use of social media to mitigate the impact of natural hazards has also been well documented by now (Chatfield and Reddick, 2018).

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These examples are not meant to be exhaustive, but they demonstrate how technology holds a lot of untapped potential in terms of improving Portuguese public administration, as long as there are continued efforts to engage in the systematic and integrated connection with administrations in other countries to promote mutual learning and to identify best practices through comparative learning systems based on indicators.

13.7 CONCLUSION

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This chapter showed how Portuguese public administration under the New State regime was primarily dominated by the bureaucracy. Despite the regime's undemocratic ethos, top-level officials took on a key policy-making role in government in Waldo's sense, but the ideals of democratic governance, equity, and representation of the bureaucracy remained absent. The late introduction of New Public Management principles and practices in the period of 1990–2010 shifted the attention of the bureaucracy to efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness. However, this progress was not accompanied by the widespread adoption of the participatory and deliberative tools that characterize Waldo's ideals. The chapter shows the gaps that remain in the democratization of Portuguese public administration and how technological innovation and the use of ICTs can help bring about a more inclusive and democratic

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Regarding the study of Public Administration, multiple gaps remain, and the work is cut out for scholars wishing to develop a career in this field of study. Firstly, intergovernmental relations and decentralization remain poorly studied and understood. At the start of the third decade of the twenty-first century, Portugal remains a highly centralized country, as evidenced by about 88% of all public spending occurring at the level of central government administration. This is hardly surprising. Excessive centralization is part of the country's administration genetic code (Araújo, 2002), copied from the Napoleonic model, cultivated during the New State dictatorship, and largely immutable after the Democratic Revolution, despite early claims of renewal. However, this evidence underscores the need to understand how extensive decentralization could result in an administration that is closer to its citizens but also improved citizen representation and effectiveness of popular participation in policymaking and implementation. Public administration scholars should study the practice of decentralization from a managerial perspective, seeking to understand which policy areas

show concessions to greater local influence in public programmes as well as the role of field personnel (street-level bureaucrats) in generating a more democratic governance.

C13.P49

Secondly, scholars should seek to describe and explain the role played by the relationship between politicians and the bureaucracy in the continuity and change of policymaking in Portugal. Within parliamentary democracies, there are four institutional tools that signal continuity or enact change in policymaking (Huber and Shipan, 2002): 1) budget politicization of cuts and raises; 2) appointment power; 3) reorganization of departments and agencies; and 4) monitoring institutions. The role played by these tools in the Portuguese context, particularly how their use varies across policy areas and organizational arrangements, is still unexplored and requires additional research.

C13.P50

Lastly, the consequences of the significant institutional fragmentation that resulted from NPM reforms remain unaddressed. The delegation of authority from traditional bureaucratic agencies to organizations 'at arm's length' from the state needs further study, particularly in terms of their levels of autonomy and accountability mechanisms in the pursuit of the public interest. The massive shift to public institutes and autonomous agencies during the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as the reversal of some of these decisions during the PRACE and PREMAC have never been studied, despite the importance of these reforms across all sectors of Portuguese public administration. We know that the later reforms led to reductions in the number of public sector organizations and in the number of top and midlevel managers, but their impact in terms of cost savings, service quality, and democratic accountability to citizens is still unknown.

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